Bao Nhiêu Thắc Mắc Cho Vừa
Về Thảm Trạng Đất Nước Hôm Nay?
Văn Nguyên Dưỡng

Thưa quý độc giả và bằng hữu,

Gần đây chúng tôi nhận được bản tin về những câu hỏi khẩn thiết của Nhà giáo Trần thị Lam, người đã làm bài thơ làm rúng động Hà Nội và được cả triệu lượt người đọc trên Facebook. Các các câu hỏi của Cô, thế hệ trẻ Việt Nam ở trong nước và ở hải ngoại cần biết và cần những câu trả lời thích đáng.

Giáo sư Tiến sĩ Mai Thanh Triết đã có những câu trả lời ngắn nhưng chính xác. Riêng câu hỏi thứ 4, theo TS Triết, thì chưa có một tài liệu nào viết về chuyện này. Thực ra thì đã có một tài liệu viết bằng Anh ngữ cách đây 20 năm. Nhưng ở thời điểm đó các mạng internet chưa mở rộng nên chưa có dịp đăng tải.

“Nên Kinh tế Thị trường Định hướng Xã hội Chủ nghĩa” của CSVN là rập khuôn chủ trương kinh tế đổi mới của Đặng Tiểu Bình, cộng sản Tầu.

Xin nhớ lại, sau khi Hoa Kỳ bỏ bạn Đồng Minh Nam Việt Nam bằng Hiệp ước Paris tháng 1/1973 và ngày 30/4/1975 Sài Gòn sụp đổ. Sau khi thống nhất hai miền Bắc, Nam, Đảng CSVN đã tức tốc áp dụng chính sách tàn độc nhổ cỏ tận gốc và phế bỏ tất cả tàn dư của thể chế nhân bản, tự do của Miền Nam, giam cầm toàn bộ sĩ quan của QLVNCH, Cảnh sát, lãnh tụ tôn giáo, đảng phái quốc gia và giới trí thức, báo chí, nhà văn, nhà báo, kể cả nhà giáo. Đốt sách, cấm chợ, đánh tư sản mại bản, tịch thu hầu hết xí nghiệp sản xuất và cơ sở thương mại tư nhân, đổi tiền, bần cùng hóa toàn dân Miền Nam và thiết lập nền móng xã hội chủ nghĩa rập khuôn Liên Sô từ hạ tầng cơ sở nông thôn đến thị thành với hệ thống “Mậu dịch quốc doanh”. Kết quả là hàng chục triệu người mất công ăn việc làm và lâm vào hoàn cảnh sống dở, chết dở. Hàng triệu gia đình thuộc giới cao và trung lưu phải bị lưu đày đói no ở các khu kinh tế mới. Trong khi đó, các lãnh tụ đảng CSVN tham lam và mù quáng, xua quân xâm chiếm Cao Miên, gây cuộc chiến đẫm máu với cộng sản Tầu, làm cho nền kinh tế nghèo nàn xã hội chủ nghĩa càng thêm kiệt quệ... Thay đổi kinh tế, phá bỏ hệ thống quốc doanh thay bằng hệ thống kinh tế thị trường theo lối của Trung Cộng là tất nhiên... Nhưng ngụy biện là sách lược chính của Đảng CSVN.

Xin mời đọc cả hai tài liệu dưới đây. Tuy đã viết trên hai thập kỷ, nhưng các bài viết này vẫn giữ được giá trị thời sự đang tiếp diễn. Và những ước tính về một tương lai đen tối của Việt Nam dưới chế độ cộng sản toàn trị, từ hai mươi năm trước, đã diễn ra như một hiện thực đau lòng hiện nay làm cho cả một dân tộc đang lâm vào cảnh khốn cùng thật bi đát.

Chiếc đầu tàu CSVN đang đưa đất nước vào vực thẳm, nếu không có một phép lạ như một thiên cơ huyền bí cứu vãn thì cái họa mất nước khó mà tránh khỏi. Thiên cơ ai mà lường trước được? Nhưng phép lạ thường diễn ra.

Xin mời đọc một bài viết về một khúc quanh của lịch sử Việt Nam sau chiến tranh dưới đây.

Over the past two decades, Asian countries in the Pacific rim have developed at an accelerate space, so much so that the world has marveled at their transformation. According to official statistics, the economic growth rate of the most countries in this region exceeds the rest of the world by a large margin. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is the one of the few exceptions.

The Vietnamese people, as well as their political friends and economic neighbors, all share an interest in turning Vietnam in to a free, peaceful and prosperous country. But is there any chance for the country join the rest of the region on the road to development? The answer was yes, especially after the United States of America lifted its embargo against Vietnam in March 1994. However, the obstinate aptitude of the communist Party of Vietnam’s leaders and their limited reform policies since 1986 have been the main obstacles of the country’s modernization.

After a decade of observing the economic reform in Vietnam, the majority of the world economic experts and political analysts predict that their will be no economic modernization in Vietnam. Nor will the nation have prosperity without freedom and democracy. Although many of them admit that Vietnam, in the past ten years, had made a number steps in its movement from Socialist economy to Market economy. Experts argue that the issue is still fundamental unchanged since the Communist leaders are neither able to solve the pretty of the mass of Vietnamese people nor capable of assuring the future destiny of the country. The Communist leaders in Vietnam believe that their “economic renovation” is an ideal “socialist-oriented economy”, which brings modernization to the nation and prosperity to the people. On the contrary, many Vietnamese intellectuals in exile deny this argument. They accuse Hanoi-leaders of “trying to consolidate the devastated Communist regime in Vietnam while attempting to exploit its geopolitic position in Asia-Pacific and its human and natural resources for their own greed of wealth, prosperity and power. Their economic reforms set up a new class of Red-Capitalists in Vietnam.

In reality, the economic reforms in Vietnam are very complicate and comprehensive. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these controversial arguments, but the purpose is to assess Vietnam’s chances in joining the Asian economic matters for a viable economic reform and development.

I. Overview of the Vietnam Situation after the war-end in April 1975.

11. Economic reforms in Vietnam, an issue has two faces.

Before discussing economic reforms in Vietnam, recognition of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), or the Worker Party, most critical principle is essential. It is a principle that governs all activities in the government, in the nation, and within the party itself. This principle is that all official statements and documents, such as political announcements, economic statistics, reports, books, press releases, news, comments, and even laws, have been formulated, regulated and circulated as propaganda for the interests of the CPV and its leaders alone. These statements and documents are not true but paradoxical. “Paradox” therefore is the standard and is applied throughout the regime’s hierarchy from highest to lowest levels as the communist principle. Any violations of this principle by any party’s echelons or lower grades are condemned of “anti-regime”. Consequently, paradox under Vietnamese Communist regime means to exaggerate, lie, or falsify official and unofficial information which is covered under demagogic words and numbers. “Paradox” practices are followed especially in political reports and economic statistics. The highest degree of CPV’s paradox can be defined as “ an issue has two faces, one is superficial and the other is hidden.”

It is hard to understand the true causes and effects of the economic reforms in Vietnam if we do not recognize the CPV’s paradox. Indeed, the party’ s paradox was visible during the Vietnam War and from 1979 period of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Recently, the CPV published an official economic book written by Đặng Đức Đàm, a member of the Central Committee of the Party and an economist. This economic book is titled “Vietnam’s Economy 1986-1995”. This book has been considered by many international economic observers as an exaggerative political and economical document. However, the economic statistic of the book will be used in this essay to continue to assess Vietnam’s economic reform chances.

12. Vietnam during the period 1975-1985.

a. The Vietnam War and its Aftermath:

In 1975, the Hanoi-leaders and the CPV successfully violated the Paris Accords of 1973 by attacking and occupying of South Vietnam and unified the country; Vietnam came totally under he Communist regime itch political, economical, military ladministration structure not unlike that of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It seems that every one in the nation was working for the people. This regime created a mechanism that possibly submerge the country more deeply into the Pacific.

Reflecting back to the 1960’s, Vietnam was at the same level of economic development as that of Taiwan, Singapore, or South Korea. A war and three decades later, Vietnam has become one of poorest countries in the world, while Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea have become Giants in the Pacific Rim.

A series of critical issues have greatly influenced the economic destiny of Vietnam. The first issue is the backwardness of leadership. The evolution of Vietnam needs creative leadership, but the Vietnamese statement bury themselves in the ideology of “socialist revolution” of the past first decade of this century. It is difficult for the CPV leaders to recognize how this ideology has become, especially since the universal trend is moving toward economic integration and cooperation. Under the pressure of international events, Hanoi-leaders have gone from an extreme to another. Sometimes they adopted an attitude of self isolation and called it “independence”, boasting that they represent “the human supreme mind”. Sometimes they mobilized the whole nation to achieve “international duties”, copying the most minute details of the “Stalinist model” while regarding other countries as enemy. The backwardness of the leadership in Vietnam impeded the economic development in society and pushed the whole country towards a course of collapse.

The second issue is the extreme poverty of people. As a matter of fact, the war has devastated the whole country from the North to the South and from the cities to the rice fields. Several economic indicators such as partial starvation in the northern and central provinces, poor crops’ production, population increases, the high level of unemployment and underemployment, the high rate of inflation and deficits, chaotic distribution, and the low level of life expectancy. Among the basic issues facing Vietnam during the period 1975-1985, poverty was the most apparent and devastating.

The third issue is the deterioration of the resources and potentials. The national resources under the Vietnamese communist regime have severely misused to the point of wasting away the tremendous reservoir resources and resourceful people. first concern is the country’s youth. The youth generation is not ready to assume the role of the future generations upon which the the nation relies to rebuild. Statistics provided by an issue of the Nhan Dan Daily ((The People Daily of the CPV) in 1990 gave an alarming note on the disorientation and the lack of will of the Vietnamese youth. They have been victims of the educational, economic, and political systems in Vietnam creating a serious problem of limited future human resources. Second concern is natural resources. Natural resources have been exhaustively and disorderly exploited. This has created a tremendous threat on ecology and severely decreased the living conditions. The already limited resources ưere mostly wasted rather used. Theft of equipments and parts, and dilapidation of national assets were common practices. Last but not least, the national assets suffered great losses in important fields of cultural heritage and intellectual knowledge. This was the result of propaganda and one-way information. The Vietnamese intellectuals became more and more worn down such that the people seldom dare to think differently than that the official line on everything in life.

There are more issues, but the most important one which has retarded the Vietnamese people’s ability to rebuild their country was the ambitious outcomes of war by the CPV-leaders in Cambodia.

b. The Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia and the Sino-Vietnamese War.

The period of 1976-1980 was presumed to a period that Hanoi-leaders would take the opportunity to rebuild their country and to improve the living standard of their people so that they would be rid of poverty and sufferings they had previously encountered. Unfortunately, under the Communist regime, everything is decided by the CPV and not the true, actual requirements of the people.

At the end of 1977, Hanoi-leaders committed an act which effectively erased all the trust of neighboring countries. The countries of ASEAN and around the world could not believe that Hanoi would decide to bring the country into war again by moving troops across the Cambodian borders and occupying Cambodia. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia r became the main cause of the war with the People’s Republic of China. On February 17, 1979 in order “to teach Vietnam a lesson” China launched 200,000 troops, 1,200 tanks through Vietnamese borders and attacked Vietnamese troops in their territories after Hanoi had strengthened its invasion forces to occupy Phnom Penh in January 15 (The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 1525).

Hanoi-leaders did nothing to solve their own problems within Vietnam by dragging them into war. On the contrary, it created even more internal and economic adversities for Vietnam. People were drafted in order to reinforce the occupation army in Cambodia and the armies in the north border. More budget had allocated for military and huge police army which was used to control segments of the population. Though aid was provided by the USSR and some Eastern poured aid European countries, unfortunately Vietnam had in exchange to relinquish some of its sovereignty. The CPV agreed to the USSR setting up the naval base and air base in Cam-Ranh Bay and Danang, in the interest of Soviet strategy.

After decades of continuous conflicts with millions of people engaged long term fighting and any budget fund mainly devoted to the war efforts, normalcy seemed to exclude the notion of peace. After 1975 any attempt to rebuild the country was abolished by the CPV’ s leaders themselves.

II. Economic Reforms in Vietnam from 1986-1999.

21. Causes:

Vietnam’s economy was greatly damage by the reduction of Soviet’s economic support, withdrawn in the early 1980’s, especially under Gorbachov’s Administration from 1985 onward. For years, the leadership in Hanoi had pursued a pro-Soviet policy and had opposed China, both before and after the Sino- Vietnamese War in 1979. To reward such loyalty, the Soviet and its allies in Eastern Europe poured aid into Vietnam. This economic aid was estimated at about 1.5 billion dollars a year from the Soviet Unions alone. Unfortunately, when it was cut, Vietnam’s economy collapsed.

As known as for 21 years, American aid had played a major role in the economic well-being of the people of the South Vietnam and their modernization efforts. In 1975, this came to an abrupt end. Four years later, in the wake of Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia and the resulting ineffective war, China cancelled nearly 100 aid projects to Vietnam. With this, Vietnam lost its last source of reconstruction assistance.

In addition, Vietnam’s foreign deb was overwhelming. According to Nguyễn văn Linh, the former Secretary General of the CPV, during a report broadcasted by Hanoi radio on November 8th, 1986, the total amount of Vietnam-Soviet debt come to 15 billion routes, which converted to 8.4 billion dollars. To overcome this extra debt to Russia would add an extra burden to the country which already was in arrears with many other countries of the world.

The economic stringencies faced by Hanoi government during the 1975-1985 period were massive. Insufficient budget for administration needs, excessive rinsing debts, cut off in financial aid by Soviet Unions, internal economic unrest, maintaining over 1,500,000 troops, all created more problems for Hanoi-leaders. The government was forced to export labor overseas to pay off foreign debts, to use the Cambodian conflicts as an economic exchange.

The economic policies in Vietnam were changed whether the CPV want it or not. It became a matter of survival in order to save the regime.

However, according to the official media of the regime, the “economic renovation” (Đổi Mới Kinh tế) was not changed, a reform of economy, nor a transition from Socialism to Market Economy. For years, Hanoi has denied the fact that the CPV leaders were forced to change their economic policies. Officially, they stated that the “revocation” was part of the inner reasons of the CPV’s ideology. In fact, in “Vietnam’s Economy 1985-1995”, Đặng Đức Đàm has written these forewords: “Economic Renovation in Vietnam started in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Yet until 1986 it was basically carried out within the centralized planning mechanism, with policies designed to improve and readjust it, rather than replace it with the Market Mechanism.”

In reading the foreword of his economic book, one might have the impression that the economic reforms in Vietnam was truly a “national development of the Communist economy. In addition, it appears that “Economic Renovation” was a basic thinking of Socialism or Communism!.. As Đặng confirmed father in the book, “The basic content of the policy of promoting a multi-sector economy to a socialist-oriented, multi-sector one in which the state plays a leading role.” (P.20, Vietnam’s Economy 1986-1995, Thế Giới Publishers, Hanoi 1995, Đặng Đức Đàm). This explanation of Đặng was a big lie or a propaganda catchphrase. Đặng is really a true communist leader, like others, who always labeled the CPV as the “Creator”.

22. Reforms’ Processes during the Period 1986-1990.

In 1986, the Sixth Convention of the CPV chose Nguyễn văn Linh as Secretary General of the Party. The “economic renovation” started immediately based on the Sixth Convention Congress Decision of the following key tenets: “The policy regarding a multi-sector economy is of long term strategy significance; it bears the character of a law governing the passage from small production to a large-scale socialist production, it reflects a democratic spirit in economics, it ensures for everybody the possibility of earning his or her live hood in keeping with the law (Đặng Đức Đam 1995, pp 19-20).

In reality, the partial economic liberalization of Vietnam was in response to the rapid deterioration of the economic situation and the pressure of the Soviet Unions. Three main programs were launched to: increase food production, increase production of consumer goods, and increase exports.

To implement these economic programs the following economic measures were introduced:

a. In Agriculture: the gradual dissolution of the collective farms with the land and agricultural implements being returned to the farmers who will hold the land under long term lease (up to 15 years); replacement of the rice quota and the force sale of rice to government agencies by a system of agricultural tax which farmers can pay either in kind or in cash; and allowing private traders to buy rice and other agricultural products.

b. In Industry and Services: opening up almost all sectors previously reserved to public enterprises to private activities and lowering the level of state support to public enterprises together with abolishing price controls and the systems of dual prices. Weakening the central system of economic planning with the individual government enterprises now being responsible for both their supplies and sale. Individual enterprises however are required to contribute to the budget an amount commensurate with their activities.

c. In Finance: establishing of a two-echelon banking system which regulates the national finances in accordance with the practice of the market economy, increasing the interest on deposit; and allowing a system of private credit cooperative to attract saving.

d. In Foreign Investment: passing a law for foreign investment opening up the country for foreign investors. (Đăng, 1995, pp. 38-48).

By mid 1989, these steps and measures of good timing succeeded in halting inflation, which stood at 4% a month, and turned around in agricultural production. However, as the end of 1990, the situation rapidly deteriorated when President Gorbachov of Russia announced his “Unilateral Convention Force Reduction” and withdrew Russian navy force from Cam-Ranh Bay, and decreased 80% of Russia’s aid to VietNam. There were serious reductions or delay in the supply of refined oil products and fertilizers. Without fertilizer and fuel the rhythmic activities of agricultural production could not be maintained.

Meanwhile, a financial scandal developed due to the lack of regulation and control. The need to keep inflation at a manageable dimension by cutting down the budget deficit had forced the Vietnamese government to cancel many vital projects needed to increase the control’s productive capacity.

As for Western investment, according to the Vietnam official figures, a total of 105 permits had been issued to foreign companies wishing to invest some 852 million dollars with about half of the fund to be in the field of oil exploitation. In announcing the above, the Nhân Dân Daily, March 12, 1990 also said none of these projects “serves the food production and infrastructure construction beside telecommunications. Moreover, 75% of these projects are located in the Southern provinces.” Whatever, the explanation might be, nobody knew for sure how many projects had been approved by the CPV’s Politburo and how many projects had been implement during the first five-year plan 1986-1990.

In trying to attract foreign investment, Hanoi has made a particular effort to invite international banks to set shop in Vietnam. Banking officials from France, The United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Indonesia are known to have visited Hanoi and Saigon (then changed the name into Ho Ci Minh City) in 1989, but nothing has come out of these visits until the United States lifted its trade embargo against Vietnam in the third month of 1994. Most of impediment can, therefore, be traced to the CPV’s own ineptitude. Even at the best times, CPV’ s leaders did not seem to know how to achieve it. They have continuously baulked at the myriads of problems that come with any project. They have continuously demonstrated unresolved doubts about what to do, which resulted in delays that no investors could tolerate.

As a matter of fact, the first five-year plan of the CPV’s “socialist-oriented economy” has failed. Besides, there were even more factors that impeded the economic reforms in Vietnam during the period 1986-1990.

III. Effects and Weaknesses

Many analysts have observed that the main factors that have impeded the “economic renovation” in Vietnam during the period 1986-1990 were: political uncertainties, the lack of environment for business, bureaucratic difficulties, the finance systems. And the poorness of the infrastructure especially transport, communications, and power generation (Lê Mạnh Hùng, Vietnam Perspective, International Conference 1990, Honolulu, Hawaii).

31. In Political Domain: The Cambodian conflict had brought Vietnam downhill even more. The hope of developing the country by inviting investment had not been successful even though Vietnam has a lot of valuable resources. Unfortunately, the investors have been no confidence in Vietnam future since there were many obstacles such as political incertitude of Hanoi leadership, bureaucratized cadres, and troublesome corruption of government’s officials of all levels.

32. In Economic Domain: The Sixth CPV’s Politburo Resolution has drafted to read: “the strategy of the renovation is to concentrate on rural areas, territorial waters, and mountainous and hilly areas; to pay great attention to rural industries; to build up a new countryside...” (Đặng, 1995, p.14). In contrary, the application of the economic reforms had shown a different direction; it concentrated on the reconstruction and the development of urban areas.The reconstruction in rural areas was neglected. As a result, Đặng described the situation as “in 1986 and 1987, agricultural production again showed signs of decline, with danger of possible recurrent stagnation. During the lean months of 1988, 9.3 million people in 21 provinces didn’t have enough food. And in many other places, the peasants were no longer attached to the land” (Đặng, p. 55). In reality, it was the time of starvation. In Thanh Hoa Province alone (South part of North Vietnam) tens of thousands of villagers became beggars causing the proud Socialist Republic of Vietnam regime to call for international food assistance. However, the various donors of the time were not convinced that their aid would really reaching the hands of Vietnamese people.

In industry, Đặng elaborated on the period of 1986-1990 by simply saying: “for Vietnamese industry, the period of low growth, that is 1990 and the years preceding it.” (p. 85). Đặng’s figures reveal total private enterprises to be 920 in 1985 with a large drop to 770 in 1990 (p.180). In five years, the private enterprises decreased by 150 units, or 17%, essentially revealed the failure of the “economic renovation”. Especially, the number of private enterprises in food production and food stuff had gravely decreased from 320 to 223 units, 36%, and from 246 to 130 units, 46%, respectively. However, the private enterprises in material construction had augmented from 64 to 131 units, or 51%. The CPV’s leaders ignored the consummation of food of the Vietnamese mass but took care of the living condition of their party’s cadres. These figures gives us a more example of the CPV’ s paradox.

The fact is, during this period of time, about fifty percent of “State Enterprises” have been transformed into “Private Enterprises” with full CPV’ s cadres control covered under the paradoxical name “private owners” (in the ensuing five-year plan the percentage have gradually increased). This means, with some CPV’ s resolutions and and government’ s degrees issued, Hanoi leaders have officially plunged the national assets without guilt and shameless. These private owners --all were family members or relatives of CPV’ leaders from the Central Committee to the Politburo-- have received more funds subsidized from National Bank than other State enterprises. They have full liberty to manage their “new businesses” without any control of the Party except for the secret promise of sharing the benefits reasonably between themselves. This economical paradox should be recognized to comprehend how the “socialist oriented economy”, or the “economic renovation” in Vietnam, during its course of implement, has led the Communist leaders and cadres to become “Red Capitalists”...

The failure of the “economic renovation” during the period 1986-1990 was even more apparent by trade deficits as follows: in 1986, deficit of 627 million US dollars; in 1987, 524 million; and in 1988, 625 million (Lê Mạnh Hùng, International Convention ơn December 6 & 7, 1990 in Honolulu, Hawaii). The national debts increased gravely but the CPV ‘s leaders and cadres were more richer and richer year after year.

IV. Progresses of the Economic Reforms, Period 1991-1995.

In 1991, real changes started when the Communist Party’s Seventh Convention has replaced Nguyễn văn Linh by Đỗ Mười as Secretary General of the Party and assigned Võ văn Kiệt as Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s Government. These decisions were viewed as a big step for the economic reforms. Võ văn Kiệt was a Southern-born intellectual and became the real salvation of the CPV, it’s regime and its economic renovation which was in critical situation in 1990. Kiệt was a liberal power that helped to open the door to the new concept of diplomacy and economy from the region and the world. But the most important factors that assisted in the growth of the Vietnamese economy included:

41. Vietnam, under the pressure of the United Nations, withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1990-1991

42. The United States lifted its trade embargo against Vietnam in early March 1994.

43. World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to help Vietnam to rebuild its national economy. While, the political and economic tumble of the Communism in Europe and the collapse of the USSR left Vietnam without financial friends and allies, therefore, the CPV was obliged to open to the capitalist world, at least in the economic matter.

In reality, it is significant that the reaction projected by Hanoi-leaders to the changes occurring in the Western European countries was not one of being particularly overjoyed.

On the contrary, they were quite worried that the events in these countries might set an example, causing similar changes in Vietnam as well. This was a clear sign that the Hanoi-leaders clung to the Socialist Communism doctrine rather than welcome any changes, except economic change. International analysts labeled this Vietnam phenomenon as a “lame horse” or “half-way reform”. Some economic reforms might temporarily help the regime but will not grant the long term prosperity for the Vietnamese people.

So far, the economic reforms have had limited results. At the end 1995, the country counted more than 25, 000 undertakings had been started including: state enterprises, joint-stock companies, limited liability companies, and private enterprises. The most visible progresses were observed four areas: agriculture, industry, services, and investments.

In general, over recent years, under the Võ văn Kiệt Administration, industrial production in Vietnam had achieved fairly growth rates which were relatively similar in most branches. in 1994, total output value increased 14% compared with previous years. State-owned enterprises continued to hold a leading position in high-tech/capital-intensive industries. However, non-state enterprises had been increased from 770 units in 1990 to 4,212 in 1993 and to 18, 697 in 1994. More than 50% of these enterprises had an average of fixed assets of more than 500 million đồng (Vietnamese basic-currency), which was about 1 million US dollars at the time and an average of floating capital of more than 260 million đồng. About 100 units had a fixed assets from 1 to 2 billion đồng. Their activities were mainly concentrated in commerce and industry. “Some of them are former state enterprises endowed with material and technological installations, good management and qualified employees,” said Đặng (pp.24-25).

44. Foreign investment and Trades: To meet the demand of capital for economic development, Võ văn Kiệt Administration had encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) and direct investment through development credit. In general, funds and capitals were coming from foreign investment and loans from the community of international financial organizations such as World Bank, IMF, and Bank of Asia. the evolution towards an open economy in Vietnam was becoming more and more in evidence since international trades had been emerged since 1994.

a. Foreign investment: Since the execution of new law, foreign investments and joint venture increased considerably. In 1994, investment licenses totaled to nearly 4 billion US dollars, a 50% rise above 1993, that created new jobs for 650 thousand people, and hidden jobs for another 100 thousand. Also in 1994 there were 214 projects investing in the fields on industry, such as oil and gas and material construction with an annual of 44% increase, 36 projects investing in tourism and hotels reached 25% of the total capital invested. Taiwan was the leading investing country with more than 180 projects and nearly 2 billion US dollars invested; Hong Kong was second with 170 projects with a total of 1.7 billion US dollars; followed by Singapore, South Korea, and Japan.

Since the lifting of US trade embargo against Vietnam (March 1994), relations between Vietnam and economic organizations of the United States and the European countries moved ahead. American companies total investment increased up to 2.7 billion US dollars. The investment level of Western and Northern European countries has grown considerably (Đặng, pp.46-48).

b. Improvement of International Trades: Basically, the activities of external economy in the recent past were realized in accordance with the Prime Minister Võ văn Kiệt and his administration’s team economic-plan, which based on the “open market”, instead of the CPV Politburo’s policy. Generally, Vietnam external economy has taken remarkable steps in development of space, depth, and expansion. Specialized exports imports enterprises whether private or State-owned have the equal right of direct export of their products to foreign markets, and to import raw materials and machines for their businesses. Therefore, imports and exports really created advantages for businesses and truly stimulated exports.

In summary, at the end of the second five-year plan of 1991-1995, Vietnam began achieve stabilization and growth. Conditions have been formulated for a brighter economy in the future. However, history of economic development in Vietnam under the socialist regime has proved otherwise...

V. Outcomes:

The transition from Socialism to Market Economy in Vietnam under Võ văn Kiệt Administration has made great progresses to help the economic development of the country and perhaps it has promised better better living conditions for the people. However, many politicians in the world have observed that the recent upheaval in Eastern Europe hardened the Hanoi’s dogmatism. Therefore, in their economic openness they did not hide the desire to have “capitalist money” poured in to revamp their “socialist regime”. But when Võ văn Kiệt and his administration’s team succeeded in allowing an “open market” to exist, political-struggle within the Vietnamese Communist Regime surfaced.

Conflicts have spread among top leaders of the CPV, especially between conservatives (pro-China, such as Lê Đức Anh, State President; Đỗ Mười, CPV’s Secretary General) and liberal (pro-Western capitalist countries, such as Võ văn Kiệt, Prime Minister; Phan văn Khải, First Vice Prime Minister). Conflicts also spread widely among top communist cadres like those between the North and the South and/or between young liberal technocrats, professional experts and conservative old leaders from all levels. The Herald International Tribune on July 3rd, 1996 summarized the situation as “the conflicts of power in Vietnam is not the split between conservatives and liberals among the CPV ‘s leaders on economic reforms, but on the split of power between the Politburo of the Party and the Government Administration.” Indeed, when Võ văn Kiệt seized the Administration power, the Politburo could not control the activities of Kiệt’s cabinet members. That became a contradiction of the communist dictatorial system of governance.

The resulting conflicts squared off the Party-seized powers and Administration-seized powers and a dozen of top leaders of both sides were elimination or killed before the Party’s VIII Convention. Finally, during that Convention held in early June 1996, three important decisions had been issued. In view of which there were three consequences as in the followings:

51. The aging leadership in Hanoi still held their positions (Lê Đức Anh, Đỗ Mười and Võ văn Kiệt). It means the power-conflict would continue.

52. A new “Political Permanent Committee” of the CPV composed of five top leaders will decide all the nation’s activities including the national economic reforms. These five members were Đỗ Mười, Lê Đức Anh, Võ văn Kiệt, and two new facesGeneral Lê Khả Phiêu -President of the CPV’s Military Committee- and Nguyễn Tấn Dũng -Vice Minister of Interior. Among them, three were conservatives with Kiệt and Dung as liberals from the South. It means that the Government Administrative branch cannot carry out its dogmatic function with such power as in the preceding years. As a result, the total power will be returned to the Party.

53. A “political committee” of employees will be reorganized in any size enterprises. In any fields, including foreign investment and joint venture’s enterprises. It means the CPV will attempt to regain its power of the national business in the near future (Ngày Nay Vietnamese Journal, July 16th 1996).

These decisions would restrict and greatly impede the development of the economic reforms again by deterring any other foreign investors in Vietnam. Therefore, nobody knows the future of Vietnam, politically and economically.

In a like manner, international observers have recognized that, after ten years of economic reforms, Vietnam has “produced” more than twenty of new “red capitalists”, each owned from 1. to 1.5 billion US dollars and about 2,000 other new capitalists, each possessed from 80 to 100 million UD dollars. Their property and assets have been distributed in Vietnam, Asia, and Europe with funds deposited in international banks. They used their privileged Communist Party and administration’s positions to enrich themselves and drain national resources by doing legal business under covered of the “private enterprises”, by engaging in the black markets, through corruption and peculation. In the cities, relatives of those in top party cadres have used their influence for private gain. In rural areas collective farms were dismantled and local officials became the-backbone of the new “rural bourgeoisies (Hawaii news, Vietnamese bimonthly, Dec.15, 1996; p.33).

So “the savage capitalism that operates under the cloak of a socialist market economy is ushering in more intensive form of explosion, greater alienation, enormous gaps between rich and poor, and growing economic and social differences between town and countryside,” said Maurice Meisner, professor of history at University of Wisconsin (Business Week, January 13, 1997; p.18).

Moreover, the deteriorating relationship between the people and its government will eliminate the notion of State and Nation. The bond and trust necessary for the normal societal functioning have evaporated. Consequently, the sense of community once characterizing Vietnamese society has faded away, replaced by selfish interests and short-sighted economic decisions. This mentality will have a long lasting effect on the grassroots people of Vietnam and hinder any revival economic efforts.

Some have argued that economic modernization will likely lead to political democracy, but others do not believe so, for there is no economic modernization without freedom and democracy. For this reason, the prerequisite conditions for any amelioration of the situation in Vietnam are basic changes in politics. First of all, there must be an end to the communist monopoly. Political democracy must be restored as right of everyone.

Conclusion:

Once the dictatorship, proletarian or whatsoever, is abolished the new political spirit will allow true national reconciliation. Accordingly, the change must involve the abolition of all systems of forced hatred and division that split the nation of Vietnam for more than half of century.

The combination of a communist bureaucracy and capitalist economics in Vietnam today, has created massive social and economic upheaval. The fear of the current leadership in Vietnam, especially after the VIII Party’s Convention, will reverse any further economic development of Vietnam, placing the whole country on a potential course of collapse and destruction with no chances of joining the Asian region in viable economic reform and development.

REFERENCES:

1. Joyce Barnathan: “Has Red Capitalists wrecked China”.
Business Week, Jan. 13, 1997, p. 18

2. Đặng Đức Đàm: “Vietnam Economy 1986-1995”; Thế Giới Publishers, Hanoi 1995;
ASIA, HC-444; D33; 1995.

3. Hoàng Lan........: “New Capitalists in Vietnam”, Hawaii New -bimonthly, Dec. 15, 1996, P.33.

4. Lê Mạnh Hùng...:”Vietnam Perspectives”; International Conference, Honolulu, HI; Dec. 6 & 7, 1990.

5. Phạm Trần...: “The VIII Convention of the Communist Party of Vietnam”, Ngày Nay, Vietnamese Newspaper, July 16, 1996, pp. 1, 2 and 4.

6. Hawaii News Vietnamese bimonthly, April 15, 1996, pp.31-32.

GHI CHÚ:

Xin đón xem Bài 2: “CHINA IN THE POST COLD WAR”.
(China’s modernization under Deng Xiaoping era)

Bao Nhiêu Thắc Mắc Cho Vừa Về Thảm Trạng Đất Nước Hôm Nay?
Trích: “Cô Giáo Trần Thị Lam: thắc mắc biết hỏi ai?”

Sinh ra trong thời bình, đã từng tự hào vể màu cờ sắc áo, đã từng yêu đảng, yêu bác. Nhưng càng trưởng thành, tôi càng đặt ra cho mình nhiều câu hỏi thắc mắc biết hỏi ai?

Và cô giáo đặt ra 13 câu hỏi:

1-Việt Nam có 9.000 giáo sư, 24.000 tiến sĩ nhưng không có bất kỳ bằng sáng chế nào. Vậy số giáo sư, tiến sĩ đó, họ làm gì?

2-Giáo dục Việt Nam cải cách không ngừng, vậy tại sao 63% sinh viên thất nghiệp khi ra trường có việc làm?

3-Báo chí ca ngợi người Việt Nam thân thiện hiếu khách, vậy tại sao đa số du khách nước ngoài tuyên bố sẽ không quay trở lại Việt Nam lần thứ 2?

4-Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam thừa nhận rằng chưa có nhận thức rõ, cụ thể và đầy đủ về thế nào là “Nền kinh tế thị trường định hướng xã hội chủ nghĩa”, vậy rốt cuộc ai nghĩ ra mô hình này?

5-Nhiệm vụ của báo chí truyền thông là nói lên sự thật hay là nói lên những điều có lợi cho đảng?

6-Nhà nước nhận lương từ tiền thuế của dân để làm việc phục vụ nhân dân hay để cai trị nhân dân?

7-Công an là lực lượng được thành lập để bảo vệ dân hay bảo vệ chế độ?

8-Khẩu hiệu của quân đội là “trung với đảng”, vậy sao khi hy sinh lại ghi trên bia mộ là “tổ quốc ghi công” chứ không phải “đảng ghi công”?

9-Tại sao có “huân chương kháng chiến chống Pháp, chống Mỹ” mà lại không có “huân chương kháng chiến chống Tầu”?

10-Đảng cử thì đảng bầu, tại sao đảng cử lại bắt dân bầu?

11-Chủ nghĩa xã hội là chế độ ưu việt, vậy tại sao nó sụp đổ tại Nga, nơi nó được sinh ra và tại sao chỉ còn vài quốc gia theo mô hình này?

12-Tư tưởng Mác-Lenin là tư tưởng khai sáng nhân loại, vậy tại sao tượng Lenin bị phá sập tại Nga và các nước đông Âu trong tiếng hò reo của nhân dân?

13-Hồ Chí Minh từng nói: “Không, tôi chẳng có tư tưởng gì ngoài tư tưởng chủ nghĩa Mác-Lê”. Vậy giáo trình tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh ở đâu ra?

Văn Nguyên Dưỡng

Lời Tác giả:

Kính thưa quý độc giả và bằng hữu,

Trên mạng điện tử này của Của Hội cựu chiến sĩ Nhảy Dù QLVNCH, quý vị vừa đã đọc Bài 1 viết về “Đổi mới Kinh tế Xã hội Chủ nghĩa bằng Kinh tế Thị trường”. Chúng tôi đã trình bày rõ ràng rằng sự đổi mới đó không xuất phát từ sáng kiến của nhóm lãnh đạo Đảng CSVN mà họ chỉ thực hiện cuộc cải tạo kinh tế đó rập khuôn theo “Cuộc Đổi Mới Kinh tế của Đảng cộng sản Trung Quốc dưới thời Đặng Tiểu Bình”. Nước “Cộng hòa Nhân dân Trung Quốc” do Mao Trạch Đông sáng lập, Đặng Tiểu Bình triển khai đến cường thịnh nhờ vào sáng kiến thay đổi nền tảng kinh tế chỉ huy xã hội chủ nghĩa hủ lậu hơn cả thời quân chủ chuyên chế thành nền kinh tế dựa vào phát triển thị trường tự do theo mô hình tư bản, nên Trung Cộng chỉ trong vòng hai thập niên đã trở thành một nước lớn về kinh tế và quân sự chỉ sau Hoa Kỳ. Đặng Tiểu Bình và các lãnh tụ Đảng CSTQ vẫn giữ nguyên cơ chế chính trị cộng sản để giữ vững địa vị và quyền bính cá nhân, từ đó họ đã thao túng nền kinh tế mới du nhập từ Phương Tây này để trở thành những nhà tư bản đỏ -the Red Capitalists. Họ đã thành công trong cuộc đổi mới này. Nhưng quyền lợi kinh tế đã làm phân hóa xã hội sâu xa và quan trọng hơn là tình trạng chia chác quyền lợi, giành giựt địa vị trong đảng và chính phủ đưa đến nạn bè phái thanh toán lẫn nhau, từ trung ương đến địa phương, cộng thêm nạn tham nhũng làm cho chế độ càng thối nát, rệu rã. Gần đây Tập Cẩn Bình, với tham vọng muốn làm bá chủ thế giới, bên trong đã thẳng tay thanh trừng phe đối lập, bên ngoài gây tình trạng căng thẳng ở Thái Bình Dương, trực diện đối đầu với Hoa Kỳ và Đồng minh ở Á châu, đã tạo nên một cuộc chiến tranh lạnh mới. Chắc rằng Trung Cộng chưa làm chủ được biển Đông đã sẽ phải tan ra thành từng mảnh nhỏ trong tương lai vì sự bộc phát quá độ của chủ nghĩa đè đầu cỡi cổ của các lãnh tụ như họ Tập và sự xâu xé lẫn nhau của những con khủng long của chế độ.

Tuy nhiên, việc tìm hiểu lịch sử phát triển kinh tế và chấn hưng một nước Trung Hoa sắp mục nát sau triều đại của Mao Trạch Đông cũng cần được nghiên cứu tường tận vì ảnh hưởng của nền kinh tế xuất phát từ triều đại Đặng Tiểu Bình và sau đó phát triển cực độ, đã làm cho Việt Nam lâm vào tình huống vô cùng nguy khốn ngày nay; các nước khác ở ven bờ và trong Thái Bình Dương cùng chịu chung hiểm họa với Việt nam, nhất là Hoa Kỳ chính mình gieo gió lành sẽ phải gặt bão dữ trong tương lai. Hay nói một cách khác là “dưỡng hổ đi họa”.

Chính phủ Hoa Kỳ, nhất là dưới hai nhiệm kỳ của Tổng thống Bill Clinton, qua sự kiện gia đình ông nhận ngân khoản tài trợ khá lớn cho việc ứng cử tổng thống của một tên Hoa kiều mà cánh diều hâu Đảng Cộng Hòa Quốc Hội Hoa Kỳ mở cuộc điều tra cho rằng Trung Cộng đã xen vào nội bộ chính trị của Hoa Kỳ, hay vì các ly do khác như bảo đảm sự an toàn cho Nam Hàn, nhất là Đài Loạn, hoặc sự an toàn mậu dịch cho hơn ba vạn kiều dân Hoa Kỳ sinh sống tại Hồng Kông, như luận điệu của giới báo chí Hoa Kỳ binh vực cho TT. Clinton, mà chính phủ Clinton đã ban cho Trung Cộng chế độ “tối huệ quốc” về mậu dịch, thiết lập hệ thống liên lạc ngoại giao chặt chẽ với chính phủ Trung Cộng. Hơn nữa, đã can thiệp mạnh mẽ cho Trung Cộng gia nhập Khối Mậu Dịch Thế Giới (the World Trade Organization, WTO) và vay tiền từ quỹ Tiền tệ và Ngân hàng Thế giới. Nên nhớ rằng thời điểm đó Khối cộng sản Liên Xô và Đông Âu đã tan ra rồi, Hoa kỳ đâu cần sự liên kết với Trung Cộng. Liên kết để làm gì? Có ích lợi gì. Hoa Kỳ đâu thiếu thị trường tiêu thụ sản phẩm tân tiến của mình, khối Đông Âu, Nam Mỹ, Á Châu, Phi Châu rộng lớn và khối Trung Đông. Lúc đó, Hoa Kỳ đang là bá chủ thế giới, tại sao lại phải cần hết mình tài trợ cho Trung Cộng mà không tận diệt nó? Xin quý vị đọc bài viết dưới đây rồi sẽ tìm lấy câu trả lời thích đáng riêng.

Mới đây, ông Donald Trump đắc cử trong Kỳ bầu cử ngày 8/11/2016, sẽ trở thành vị tổng thống thư 45 của Hoa Kỳ. Mọi giới người Việt Nam hải ngoại đã viết rất nhiều bình luận về sự đắc thắng ngoài dự đoán của mọi giới chẳng những ở Hoa Kỳ và nhiều nước khác trên thế giới. Chúng tôi không muốn lạm bàn, nhưng chỉ xin nêu lên một vài yếu kiến nhỏ. Điểm quan trọng nhất về đối nội là triệt tiêu thứ tham nhũng đóng băng hơn nhiều thập niên qua, bắt đầu từ chính phủ Clinton, thành lập một chính phủ nhẹ và hiệu quả và đề nghị một thời hạn tối đa cho các thành viên Quốc hội để mong thay đổi tư duy chính trị và xã hội, mặc dù Ông Trump không nói rõ, hai là khai thác trữ lượng năng lượng phong phú của Hoa Kỳ để tạo thêm nhiều triệu công việc cho người dân Hoa Kỳ và ba là chỉnh đốn lại hệ thống bảo trợ y tế của Chính phủ, bốn là giảm thuế, tăng ngân sách quốc phòng và các lực lượng an ninh quốc gia. Không kể việc trục xuất khối đi dân bất hợp pháp... Về sách lược đối ngoại -foreing policy- Ông Trump có thể cùng những cường quốc khác tạo một trật tự thế giới mới, chớ không phải áp dụng chính sách “đóng cửa” hay cô lập như luận điệu bi quan của một vài nhà bình luận Việt ở hải ngoại. Trong sách lược đó Trump muốn hợp lý hóa về NAFTA, nhất là NATO rồi đến chính sách Mậu dịch với Trung Cộng có lợi hơn cho Hoa Kỳ. Có người cho rằng Ông Trump tuyên bố rút quân khỏi Thái Bình Dương bỏ mặc Nhật, Nam Hàn và các nước Á Châu. Nhắc lại ngày trước TT Johnson khi bước chân vào Nhà Trắng đã từng cân nhắc việc bỏ rơi Nam Việt Nam mà lo chú tâm vào việc xây dựng Một Xã hội lớn -A Great Society- cho chính nước Mỹ hơn là tiếp tục giữ Nam Việt Nam. Nhưng chỉ 24 giờ sau khi vào Nhà Trắng ông đã nghe theo các cố vấn và tướng lãnh mà tiếp tục yểm trợ cho nhóm tướng lãnh đảo chính giết anh em Ông Ngô Đình Diệm, lập nền Đệ Nhị Cộng Hòa và tiếp tục lập sách lược be-bờ chống khối cộng sản, mặc dù ông biết họ bất tài. Ngày nay cũng vậy, tân tổng thống Hoa Kỳ đâu có thế nào rút quân bỏ Nam Thái Bình Dương. Một người làm chính trị dù yếu kém cũng nhìn thấy sự thế địa dư chính trị, quân sự và con đường hàng hải thương mại của Thái Bình Dương và Vùng biển Tây Ấn Độ Dương là quan trọng biết chừng nào đối với Hoa Kỳ. Các tướng lãnh và các chiến lược gia lỗi lạc Hoa Kỳ đâu thế nào không thuyết phục được vị tổng tư lệnh của họ hay sao!

Còn chuyện ông Trump tuyên bố hủy bỏ Hiệp thương Xuyên Thái Bình Dương hay các hiệp thương khác nằm trong sách lược duyệt lại toàn bộ chính sách kinh tế và mậu dịch toàn cầu của Hoa Kỳ có thể tạo diễn biến mới về kinh tế và tài chánh thế giới có lợi và tạo thêm công ăn việc làm cho dân chúng Hoa Kỳ, biết đâu cũng sẽ tạo nên chuyển biến dân chủ cho Trung Cộng và có thể Việt Nam sẽ phải tiến hành không những cuộc cải tổ kinh tế thị trường dân chủ mà còn có khả năng giúp cho quần chúng Việt Nam thức tỉnh làm cuộc cách mạng lập nền tảng chính trị đa nguyên và dân chủ sớm hơn Trung Cộng nữa. Chúng tôi không cảm thấy bi quan, ngược lại còn cảm thấy hy vọng vào quần chúng Việt Nam tự mình biết rõ phải làm gì hơn là trông đợi vào thế lực ngoại trợ mang tự do và dân chủ vào cho mình...

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Văn Nguyên Dưỡng

The international political environment has direct effects, whether good or bad, on international economics. For this reason, many strive to stay current of worldwide political development to anticipate changes in the global economic environment.

Nowadays, the biggest question that surface among all nation's leaders, politicians, military strategists, and expert economists around the world is the rise of eastern giant, China, that has replaced the former Soviet Union. China's recent modernization has generated awe among its neighbors. Lee Kwan Yee, one of the shrewdest state men in Asia, said in 1994 that China will soon force a restructuring of the world's balance power. “It's possible to pretend that is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of man,” he said (U.S News Mar. 3rd, 1997, p.76). More pointedly, other nations in Asia are know asking what role the United States intends to play in the Pacific. Will it tries to contain China's growing power, as it once so successfully contained the outward trusts of Soviet Union?

The purpose of this essay is to examine the Deng Xiaoping's modernization policy of China, his successors' policy of development, and the foreign policy of the United States towards China.

I. GENERAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE COLD WAR.

In the past, European order of the Cold War was structured under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, as well as under the ensuing confrontation and balance between them. However, by the late 1980's, an astonishing global and political phenomenon changed the geopolitical picture of the world, when tearing down of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 led to the reunification of Germany in 1990, followed by an unexpected suddenness of the disappearance of the Iron Curtain in the Soviet Union. Within a spun of less than three years, the Communist Empire and the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist.

Virtually, overnight the Eastern European countries and the ex-Soviet Union nations, with their total population of 450 million and a combined gross national product (GNP) of 3 trillion US dollars, shifted their political and economic orientation towards democracy and market economy. Initially, the changes in Europe were confined to reducing the thread of a Third World War and redefining many nations's military and political strategies. Consequently, the political environment has been undergone a substantial transformation characterized by the reshaping of political blocs, the formation of new economi-groupings, the breakup of old coalitions, and the integration in the international market of the newly emerging democracies (NEDs) and the newly developing countries (NDCs).

Some expert economists foresee the realignment of global strategic power through the emergence of new political blocs. One such bloc would consist of a reshape do Europe, which would include political and economic membership of 16 European Community nations, the Eastern European nations -the NEDs- and possibly even some of the former Soviet republics. A second bloc in the Western Hemisphere would be led by the United States including Canada, Mexico, and several Central and South American nations. A third bloc would be led by Japan composing of many nations of the Pacific Rim and others in Eastern Hemisphere. Such blocs are primarily trade-based, but could eventually incorporated many political dimensions. On the positive side, due to their relative equality of power, these blocs can be considered precursors of global cooperation, resulting in an even more open and free global business environment. But, on the negative side, by the reason of “national security” and “national interests,” an increase in ambivalence and uncertainty between the members of these blocs may produce inevitable shifts in economic and political thinking, which in turn may explode another set of unexpected and undesired results (“Inter- national Business”, Third Edition, The Dryden Press, 1995, p. 297).

II. CHINA'S MODERNIZATION UNDER DENG XIAOPING ERA.

The worldwide trend towards democracy has accelerated during the past decade and has led some to claim the inevitable takeover of democracy and free trade throughout the world. This notion has far to go to reach the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The consensus among the international politicians and economists is that the “Socialist Market Economy,” which has been a strange hybrid system engineered by Deng Xiaoping (Đặng Tiểu Bình) since 1978 will firmly rule over the Mainland China despite Deng's retiring from the leading position in the Chinese Communist Party, government, and military in 1987 and died in February 1997. The Dengist Policy is in keeping the total governance of the Communist Regime and the application of the “macro-control and micro-liberation” in China's economy as the biggest phenomenon in the world political and economic system for the late three decades of the 20th Century. The Dengist system is neither completely communist nor the democratic with its free market economy.

Deng Xiaoping, the second paramount leader of the People's Republic of China after Mao Tse-tung (Mao Trạch Đông) died in September 1976, was considered to be an ardent nationalist, a dogged pragmatist, and an unshakably committed socialist. He, with the strong support from the Party and the Army, restored order to an impoverished and chaotic nation that had been reigned by the “Gang of Four” (“Bè lũ Bốn Tên” gồm Giang Thanh, Trương Xuân Kiều, Vương Hồng Văn, và Diêu văn Nguyên). This group was led by the Mao's wife Jiang Qing (Giang Thanh) until they were eliminated in 1977 by Deng. In 1978, Deng authorized a reassessment of the Party's recent history to replace the defiant gang-of-four's program with its philosophy of “seeking truth from facts and building socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Deng used four- modernizations program to restructure China. That meant building up the Chinese economy by breaking the stagnant collective agriculture system, curtailing central economic planner's roles and decentralizing decision-making power especially about production by moving power to lower levels, modernizing the military forces, and opening China's door to the outside world to bring in hard currency and technical expertise (“The Very Last Emperor”, U.S. News, Mar. 3rd 1997, pp.24-26).

As a result from this Dengist Policy, in seventeen short years (1978-1995), China experienced spectacular progresses, especially in areas of agriculture and industry, where the private sector became important element of the nation's economy. Deng 's economic modernization benefited a vast portion of the country, particularly in coastal areas and major cities. Shanghai, Quangzhou, and Zhenhen became booming cities that multiplied into deluxe-office towers of foreign companies, state-owned enterprises, and private shops and offices.

Simultaneously, this nation, the most populous in the world, furiously tried to undo the damage of the “Cultural Revolution” and the “Great Leap Forward (respectively in 1960's and 1970's under Mao Tse-tung reign). China's gross national product has increased 500 percent from 1978 to 1995, raising per capita income from barely measurable to 1,800 US dollars. The average annual growth exceeded 8%, among the highest in the world. Saving deposits grew 14,000 percent; exports went up from 10 billion US dollars a year to 153 billion. With the surprising mushroom of electronic and high-technologic companies such as the Legend Group, the Beijing Founder Electric, the Great Wall Computer Company, and other 6,000 smaller electronic companies, China's high-technological exports were expected to zoom from 2.1 billion US dollars in 1994 to 8.7 by the first years of XXI Century. The typical development of China's top electronic companies show that Chinese have changed to compete internationally with very modern yet cheaper products” (Business Week, April 14th, 1997, pp. 57-58).

In military arena, recently Lt. General Patrick Huges, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Director, told a Senate Committee that China, with its 3,000,000 men and women in the armed forces, could be a “large-scale regional threat to the United States interests within the next 10 to 20 years.” Previously, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had been dismissive of China's military. “The real fear of many military strategists is that China's build-up will feed a cold war hysteria as Beijing upgrades its backward military.” (Business Week, Mar. 17th, 1997, p. 55).

In reality, while China's military spending declined during the early 1980's, it has increased by 50% in real terms between 1988 and 1995. Some expected that China's military budget will have risen to more than 8.7 billion US dollars in 1996 and that tieu will have begun building a modern navy and air force. In addition, China is the biggest nuclear power in Asia. In 1964, China exploded its first atomic bomb and in 1967 it continued by exploding its first hydrogen bomb. China became the world's fifth nuclear power. In October, 1966 China reported firing a nuclear missile. This was its fourth nuclear explosion, but the first in which actual weaponry was tested. Under Deng Xiaoping's military modernization policy, in May 1980, China continued a tested-launch of an Inter-Continent Ballistic Missile (ICBM). It was its first successful tested-launch of an ICBM. The missile traveled 6,200 miles (The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, Fourth Edition, 1995, pp. 1429 and 1530). In the last decade had been twice hit with the U.S. economic sanctions for the transfer of its M-11 Missile technology to Pakistan and Iran.

China's population is five times larger than that the United States. It's military is the largest in the world. It has a steady growing list of trade partners to choose from. It has foreign-exchange reserves over 100,000 billion US dollars, more than Germany, and it has recently emerged as a buyer of U.S. Treasury Security. Last year, China attracted 42 billion US dollars in direct investment, a third of all investments n the development world. The way China manages its economic growth under Deng's four- modernizations economic program has and will continue to have more impact on the world environment than wealthy nations imagined. Some predict that China cannot be “contained” because it's effect on the world is already so profound (U. S. News, April 7, 1997, p.46).

After his death, Deng Xiaoping, one of China's powerful leader, is.still seen as the capitalist of bold reforms that triggered an unprecedented economy boom nearly two decades ago. Over the long term, many believe, the open door policies set in motion by Deng will lead to freer, more democratic society, as China huge population grows wealthier and demands greater rights. Nonetheless, in 1989 when students challenged the Chines Communist Party to add a fifth modernization, democracy, to its four-modernizations economic program, Deng, after weeks of debate within the Party over how to handle the growing students' demonstration in Tiananmen Square, ordered the Army to assault the demonstrators by tanks and bullets. Hundreds students were killed. Then, with the relentless hunt for remaining leaders and followers, police and army arrested and imprisoned hundreds more. Five days after the event, Deng appeared on national television to justify his decision, “if some people practice bourgeois liberalization and create turmoil by demanding bourgeois human rights, we have to stop them,” he said (U.S.News, Mar. 3, 1997, p.25). Then, the economic reforms to market economy in China was firmly standing with its communist regime.

Deng's economic legacy to China will stand along with his legacy of Tiananmen Square human rights abuses... To sum up, Maurice Meisner, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, in his new economic book “The Deng Xiaoping Era”, related that: “Rather than promoting better society, Deng's reforms have risen to a 'bureaucratic capitalism' dependent on the Communist State and its repressive apparatus for survival. By emphasizing economic well-being over everything else, Deng's approch led to a 'death spirit', and the combination of Stalinist bureaucracy and capitalist economics has created massive social upheaval.” (Business Week, Jan. 13, 1997, p. 18).

Meisner argues that, politically, under Deng's economic reforms, the Communist Party bureaucracy swelled enormously. Groups of officials used their privilege Communist Party positions to become a new “capitalist class”. They supported the political status quo because they were psychologically as well as economically dependent on the Communist state for political protection as well. On the other hand, Meisner states that, economically “the savage capitalism” that operates under the cloak of a socialist market economy is ushering in more intensive forms of exploitation, greater alienation, enormous gap between rich and poor, and growing economic and social differences between urban and rural country people.

III. CHINA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER

JIANG ZEMIN (GIANG TRẠCH DÂN) TENURE.

Jiang Zemin's emotional speech at the eulogy for Deng Xiaoping, who died on February 19, 1997, conveyed the enormous strain that he will face in living up to his promise to “make greater contributions” than his master Deng.

It is true that Jiang has amassed the most powerful titles in China, Party General Secretary, President of the State, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. But it is unclear whether he can tackle the biggest challenge of all: easing recent external and internal political problems beside stimulating more economic reforms.

Externally, Jiang faces the constant international campaigns against China's “human rights abuses”, as from the U.S. Congressional hard-liners. The Congressional “Hawks” are against China's desire to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO) despite whatever President Bill Clinton has promised with Beijing. They want to hold off the renewal of the China's most-favored-nation trade status (MFN, qui chế “tối huệ quốc”). Other political problems are the sovereignty of Taiwan, the conflicts with several nations in Pacific Rim over the rich oil islands in China Sea, and the return of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1st, 1997.

Internally, Jiang faces his political opponents such as the Premier Li Peng (Lý Bằng), the Vice Premier Zhu Rongji (Chu Dung Cơ), the Maoist ideologue Deng Liquin (Đặng Vĩnh Siêu), and the Chairman of the National People's Congress Qiao Shi (Vạn Lý) in the next National Party Congress, which will be held during Fall 1997. For now, Jiang appears to have the backing of top military leaders, who have a strong investment in maintaining the status quo.

In the meantime, the most piquant internal problem that Jiang Zemin and the Chinese Communist Party have to face is the China's whole periphery, from Xinjiang to Tibet and Yunnan, recently forming a necklace of ethnic discontent (this discontent would last for decades in the future). Beijing seems stunned by the possibility that ethnic unrest might be infectious. Xinjiang's Uigur Muslims delivered their separatist message with bombs after Deng Xiaoping's death. Now, they are calling for strikes. “Xinjiang has the potential of becoming China's Northern Ireland,” warned Barry Sautman, professor at the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology. Also the Hui Muslims in Xinjiang launched a series of bloody bomb explosions in Beijing and in Xinjiang to oppose the Han people's dominance over the Hui. Beijing will have to react carefully to experience calmer times. But initial omens are not promising (Business Week, Mar. 31, 1997, p.57).

In economics, although Deng Xiaoping's modernization policy has made China becoming the third economic powerful nation of the world (after the United States and Japan), there were several economic and social problems that Deng left without fixing. Important areas that remain unresolved include: subsidies to under-productive state-owned industries, huge debts, growing income gaps between rural regions and the booming, industrialized coastal areas, limited arable land to feed a large rural population, and the production standards that discriminate against imports. “The reality difficult part begins now,” say Konrad Seitz, Germany's ambassador to China (Business Week, April 7, 1997, p.52). Chiefly, the three biggest problems are the corruption and nepotism over the regime, the subsidies of state-owned industries, and the slippage of the mass' ideology.

Jiang Zemin inherited these problems and, so far, he has managed to fill Deng's shoes by maintaining the status quo: tinkering with the economy, fighting corruption and nepotism, battling ideology's swing between the socialist order and the democratic values, and preventing social unrest and chao (or “luan”, in Chinese, “loạn” in Vietnamese). Maintaining status quo and really solving problems are very different challenges.

The first problem, corruption and nepotism, seems not to be simple for Jiang to solve. In fact, the Party wields enormous economic influence through powerful ministries. Cadres and their children, wives or relatives hold high positions in state and local enterprises. The upside is that many Communist leaders now have unofficially vested interests in exercising corruption without any interception of the judiciary branch. they promote their family's members to official posts and preventing any big rollback of market reforms. The interests of the cadres often collide with the interests of the nation. “Everybody who has any power supports reform for selfish reasons,” said Shan Li, an executive of the Goldman & Sachs Co. in Hong Kong (Business Week, Mar, 10, 1997, p. 48).

The second problem, subsidies state-owned industries, seems to be a big hole of the national budget. In 1996, Beijing was budgeting 3.7 billion US dollars to write off bad debts of state-owned enterprises that have been taken over, otherwise they go bankrupt. Some leaders, eager to preserve one of socialism's last bastions, want to bolster the state sector rather than shrink it. Furthermore, cadres running these enterprises do not want to lose their power or perks. These state dinosaurs account for about 40% of industrial output and have run up to 240 billion US dollars in bad loan. Overall, in 1996 losses increased by 38%.

Therefore, with Deng gone, there is pressure on Jiang to distinguish himself as the new top leader and this industrial battle-ground will decide his fate and his nation's leadership. Recently, he has made state-enterprise reform a top priority as he bids to consolidate his power. A pillar of Jiang's plan is to let small and mid-size state-enterprises sink or swim, while focusing on assisting the largest enterprises from textile to machinery and metallurgy. Sectors such as likely to remain firmly under state control for many years as Jiang says: “Grasp the big, release the small.” (Business Week, April 21, 1997, p.54). Jiang's campaign is likely to fall far short of mass privatization, a step that might make economic sense but would spell political suicide for Jiang.

The third problem, slippage of ideology and social unrest, seems to be the biggest of all. There are legitimate reasons for Jiang and the Chinese Communist Party to worry. One is the fear that workers will take to the streets to protect job losses and revolt against the Party and government leaders. Diplomatic sources say that as many as 60% of state companies' workers in northern industrial city of Shenyang have not been paid for months. Similar problems are arising in Tianjin, a city not far from Beijing. Meanwhile, the most visible problem in China's major cities is the incredulous number of 100 million of people who left their home provinces to become a floating population in search for jobs. Migrants in dusty clothes from Henan cook their meals on the streets of Beijing and haunt illegal open-air job market places to find employment as laborers. Chinese officials recently lamented to visiting U.S. Commerce Under Secretary Stuart Eizenstat that Chinese state enterprises would have to lay of 40% of their workers to straighten things out. With its weak tax system, Beijing cannot afford to take over housing, schools, day care, and other services now provided by state companies. In such social conditions, a slippage of ideology from socialism to democracy among the mass population is probable.

The risk is that social pressure will explode. Perhaps because of a sharp economic downturn. That would force the Party to come up with a new justification for retaining control.

For now, Jiang and other party's leaders seem intent on the World Trade Organization entry. Global prestige and permanent most-favored-nation trade status are big reasons for repairing internal economics and social troubles. China is supported by its coastal provinces, which account for most of China's exports, imports and investment. They are accesses to overseas markets. However, many expect that political, economic and social stability, the keys for Jiang and his party's survival, depend mostly on the China's policy towards the United States. But no one knows what path China will take following the recent death of Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Zemin's action will be watched as in April (1997) he visited Moscow and signed the “Border Military Forces Cutback” treaty with Prsident Borris Yeltsin (Vietnam News broadcasted, Channel 9, April 8, 1997).

IV. THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARDS CHINA.

International expert economists predict that unless the country flies apart in the succession, China will almost surely continue its economic surge and soon resume its historic role as the most powerful nation in East Asia. With growth rates average around 9 percent a year, it's economy has already vaulted into the third-ranking position in the world and sometime in 21st Century could surpass the United States. As the largest.

With the rapid rise of China, Asia is becoming a growing flash point for the greatest conflict in the post Cold War era. The United States must decide what kind of relationship she want with China. U.S. needs to consider several major issues of importance about Asia today such as the rise of China power and its nature, the proliferation of ballistic middle and nuclear arms in the region, the maintenance of U.S. Forces in the Asia, and the possibility of Japan's military rearmament.

In the early 1979 the United States set up again diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (the first diplomatic relations were the visit Beijing of President Nixon in February 1972 and several secret talks between Henry Kissinger and China's Premier Chow En-lai to set an end of the Vietnam War). However, since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the euphoric relation between the two nations has shifted dramatically to usher in more tense relations. During the late nine years, the Bush and Clinton Administrations have carefully pursued a policy of “engagement” towards China. This policy is supported by most of the American policy elites and business leaders. The policy's strategy involves a series of short-term initiatives to help open the Chinese economy, to challenge China into responsible international behavior, and to maintain security relations. The prime idea has been that as China power inevitably grew, economic and political interaction would be the best promising way to avoid showdowns or new emergence of another cold war.

Nevertheless, that engagement has suffered recent intense pressure. Allegations exist that China attempted to influence the 1996 American elections with the John Huang's fund-raising scandal now is at the center of the nation's political problems. This dilemma has strengthened the voice of critics of the “hawks” who argue China has become a adversary. In the meantime, a chorus of voices on right and left has proclaimed that engagement approach is falling. The hawks do not support that China is a vital to the United States economic interests as opponents tress. They feel issues such as human rights and Taiwan should not be down played. They question Beijing sincerity about bringing its trade practices in line with world norm, otherwise, protectionism is likely to continue. They feel China's military will not stay undeveloped, which could be to imperil U.S. Interests and eventually dominate Asia. By the same token, China, in the past ten years has had repeated violations of the weapon non-proliferation agreements with the United States. They suggest that the United States should move towards a policy of “containment” and begin treating China as a “Evil Empire” (U.S. News, Mar. 3, 1997, p.76).

Particularly, Ross H. Munro and Richard Bernstein, both journalists and co-authors of “The Coming Conflict with China” said: “China identifies us as the enemy, and it's time we recognize it.” They observe that the Chinese, in the past five years, have staged U.S. as a raising hegemonic power out to “contain” China economic and political emergence. They argue that China, not paranoid Americans, is putting the two powers on course for a military collision. “China goals, is to become the paramount power in Asia and to supplant the United States in that role,” explained the authors. They believe China's growing foreign reserves, ballooning trade surplus with the United States, prying technology from multinationals, and acquiring of modern weapons are part of its unchallenged super-power. Munro and Bernstein also said “strategically, Beijing bureaucrats may indeed dream of becoming global powers in autos, electronics, aircraft and telecommunications” (Business Week, Mar. 24, 1997, p. 18).

The hawks are calling for the Clinton Administration to whittle down the 39.5 billion US dollars in 1996 trade deficit, which they argue is helping to finance China's military build up. They want an escalation of present strategies: pressing human rights complaints in international forums and bolstering regional-security to preserve the balance-power. That means continuing U.S. military bases whenever possible in Asia, and urging Japan and Asian allies to assure a greater defense burden. The hawks ask “why shouldn't the United States tell Asia's Tiger-economies (new economically developed counties in Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia) to share the costs and political risk of keeping the region stable or don't expect American help if China tries to grab your oil-fields” (Business Week, same issue, same page).

Other hawks voice the since China's military, political, and economic goals vary more and more from America 's, in this view, it is time to get tough with China by a variety of punishing moves such as expelling diplomats, avoiding high level contacts, withholding technology, or once again, firmly linking trade to human rights.

In the meantime, a very sensitive opposition against “engagement policy” is that the House Democratic leader Dick Gephardt, a possible contender against Al Gore in the 2,000 party's presidential election, may oppose the Clinton Administration's effort to usher China into the World Trade Organization and vote against the renewal of China most-favored-nation trade status. The concerned issue is that recently Washington is hoping to use the WTO to bind China into the system of international trading norm. Beijing also wants to join permanently favorable tariff rates for its exports and to resolve its internal troublesome affairs (U.S. News, April 7, 1997, p. 45).

The eruption of these new China's oppositions greatly complicate to the Clinton-Jiang summit which will be held in Fall 1997.

On the other side, supporters of “engagement” policy argue the the United States can help shape the future by turning China's desire to enter the WTO into an opportunity for future pluralism. The reason is that Chinese Communist Party 's reformists, on of them is Vice Premier Zhu Rongji -a possible second Deng Xiaoping- wants downsize the huge state- owned sector, create an independent Parliament, build a new legal system, and open the entire economy to market forces. A mercantile economic policy favors their rule. “By insisting on serious WTO entry rules, the United States can bolster the reformers, help spread the pluralism-producing solvent of market capitalism, and peacefully integrate China into the global system” (Business Week, Mar. 10, 1997, p. 126).

In addition, major U.S. companies are part of the investment wave and see their presence in China as vital to their global strategy. Their interests have played a much more decisive role in administration policy than has any suspected Chinese political contribution. These companies such as Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola, AT&T, Motorola, General Motor, and Boing have placed huge bet on China. Northwest' managing director for Greater China and Southeast Asia, James P. Rennolt, said during his second trip to Beijing “we deem the China market to be a major part of our future.” (Business Week, May 12, 1997, p. 58).

The China debate comes at a moment when China is in midway through its economic reforms and its leaders are maneuvering to establish themselves as successors to Deng Xiaoping. China's power and national pride on one hand combined with its insecurities on the other make it difficult to come up with a consistent U.S. policy. So does the fact that very conflicts potentially loom in the future.

Therefore, the current opposition of the American hawks and their demand for reassessment of China policy or the current inquiry of Republicans in the Congress on the “Donorgate” (the Chinese American Huang's donated a great sum of money to Harry Clinton to help her husband, Bill Clinton -on his presidential election in 1996- as it was stated above) may do real harm to the Sino-American relations and to the Clinton's presidency, the recent U.S. Policy towards China cannot be changed. There are some important reasons to keep the policy of “engagement”.

The first reason is that Washington needs to maintain Chinese cooperation on the sensitive subject: Hong Kong. When the British colony returns to Chinese sovereignty, the signals from Beijing are that it will limit political rights such as freedom of expression. With Hong Kong as a center of American business activities throughout the Asian-Pacific region and home of 36,000 Americans, a perilous U.S. policy could lead to break in the Sino-American relations and influence American interests. China's control of Hong Kong means Washington's and Beijing's interests will overlap to an extent in maintaining the territory's communications, transportation, and finance roles.

The second reason is that Washington needs China to help maintain stability on the Korean peninsula, where 37,000 American troops are on the frontline with South Korean armies against a million men of North Korean military. With North Kora chronically appearing to be on the brink of economic collapse, Americans want Chinese cooperation in avoiding military explosion.

The third reason, is the biggest conflict, however, is Taiwan. At the time diplomatic relations were established with the United States in early 1979, the People's Rebublic of China considered Taiwan a province of China. However, the United States continued to support Taiwan building up its military and economy. Taiwan stood itself as a nation and became one of the five Tiger-economies of Asain-Pacific. It was only a year ago that China staged military exercises in the Formosa strait to intimidate Taiwanese voters during their first presidential election. Three months before this election, in February 1996, Chinese Premier Li Penguin warned the world: “We have consistently encouraged the peaceful reunification of the motherland, but it final analysis we cannot promise to give up the use of force.” Since then, China has only grown more bellicose by launching missiles in the direction of Taiwan and conducting military exercises calculated to keep Taiwan thinking about the possibility of an invasion. (U.S. News, Feb. 12, 1996, p. 44). Still, despite the heat from Beijing, there remains a clear Taiwanese consensus against reaching the solution of reunification with China. Many people believe that Taiwan can only be secured with the backing of the United States. In fact, the diplomatic relations between the United States and China are governed by the “Taiwan Relations Act” of 1979, which promised the U.S. arms assistance to Teipei and pledged unspecified action in case of China attack. Therefore, an “use of force” to attack Taiwan would lead China to a real war with the United States. Instead, after China regains control of Hong Kong, many experts believe it will tries anew to bring Taiwan into its embrace.

The United States ice in delicate situation to maintain the status quo of the “two Chinas” without upsetting Beijing. This is the biggest problem at all, because Chinese President Jiang Zemin once declared, a week before his summit with President Bill Clinton in November 1995, that: “We can discuss anything except Taiwan independence, or Two Chinas, or one China one Taiwan.” (U.S.News, Oct. 30, 1995, p. 47).

So far, Clinton's policy-makers have prepared arguments for the next brutal debates in Congress to convince Republican Hawks for the allowance of a most-farrowed-nation trade status renewal for China and its entry into the World Trade Organization. The Clinton Administration recently has reached an agreement on nuclear tests with China and gotten high-level signals that top Chinese leaders are serious about resolving their differences with the United States.

Indeed, the Clinton Administration is asking for patience. In other words, it would mean that the real issue now is how the United States carefully manages the conflicts with China in a way that does not jeopardize the U.S. economic and geopolitical goals in the face of deep cultural and political differences. Of course, China knows that America's military commitment to keep the power-balance stable in Asia is certain, firm, and constant. On the contrary, the United States is also alarmed tha China will never again be s sleeping giant. Those days are over. What the two governments could develop is a way for getting along and resolving disputes. Clear, constant, and frequent communications is part of that. That is what the two are attempting to do. Al Gore's trip to Beijing last March cleared the way for Chinese President Jiang Zemin to visit the United States this fall and for President Bill Clinton to visit China in 1998. Thus, “Engagement Policy” may eventually work better than American Hawks believe, says David Gergen, editor at large of U.S. News (U.S. News, Mar. 3, 1997, p.76).

BIOGRAPHY:

1. BRIAN PALMER: “The Very Last Emperor”, U.S. News, Mar. 3, 1997, pp. 24-25. “The Year of the Hawks”, U.S. News, Apr. 7, 1997, pp. 46-47.

2. DAVID GERGER: “From One Giant to Another”, U.S. News, Mar. 3, 1997, p. 76.

3. DEXTER ROBERTS & BRUCE EINHORN...: “Going Toe to Toe With Big Blue and Compaq”, Business Ưeek, April, 14, 1997, pp.55-57.
“Blazing Away at Foreign Brands”, Business Week, May 12, 1997, p.58.

4. JOHN TEPLEAN: “The EthnicTinderboxInside China”, Business Week, Mar. 31, p. 57.

5. JOYCE BARNATHAN: “Has Red Capitalism Wrecked China?” Business Week, Jan, 13, 1997, p. 18. “The Party Is the Problem?”, Business Week, Mar. 10, 1997, p. 48.

6. PAUL MAGNUSSON: “Slow Dance with the Dragon”, Business Week, Apr. 7, p. 52.

7. PETER ENGARDIO: “Day of the China-Bashers”, Business Week, Mar. 17, 1997, p. 55. “Is China the New Evil Empire?”, Business Week, Mar. 24, 1997, p.18.

8. EDITORIALS: “The Power Struggle in China”, Business Week, Mar. 10, 1997, p.126.

9. THE HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA, Fourth Edition, 1995, p. 1429 and p. 1530.

10. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, Third Edition, The Dryden Press, 1995, p. 297.

11. VIETNAM'S NEWS BROADCASTED, Channel 9, Apr. 28, 1997.

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